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Abstract
Previous research on moral licensing demonstrates that individuals who behave morally
are less willing to help in the future; but is this still the case when the cost of helping is
low? The present thesis examined the effects of moral licensing on prosocial behavior
that is high in cost-to-self and low in cost-to-self. Contrary to past literature, participants
in the control condition did not rate themselves as more willing to help than participants
who felt morally licensed. This presents a need for more thorough research on the
mechanisms of moral licensing. Participants did, however, rate themselves as more
willing to help when the cost-to-self was low than when the cost-to-self was high. These
findings are important for understanding how moral licensing works, specifically with
respect to cost of helping, to predict when people are likely or not likely to engage in
moral behaviors.
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Moral Licensing
Moral licensing is a phenomenon in which individuals feel confident enough in
their morality to refrain from acting morally in the future (Merritt, Effron, & Monin,
2010). People with a strong moral identity (e.g., a person that has just helped) are more
likely to then engage in immoral behavior because it is not a threat to their positive selfconcept (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin 2009). They maintain a self-view that is consistent
with their previous behavior and have proof through that moral deed that they are a moral
person. They therefore feel entitled to act immorally without feeling like an immoral
person.
Moral licensing includes the moral credits approach and the moral credentials
approach (Merritt et al., 2010). The moral deed a licensed person performed can serve as
a moral credit which is added to the individual’s personal account of acts, both moral and
immoral. A person feels licensed when their moral account maintains more helping acts
than harmful acts, and they therefore will not feel guilty for spending some moral credits
on immoral behavior—they can afford it (Merritt et al., 2010). The moral deed can also
be a means by which the person interprets a morally ambiguous behavior. In the moral
credentials approach, the prosocial deed can inform the morality of a subsequent act in
light of the individual’s past behavior, yielding a second kind of licensing (Merritt et al.,
2010). It was hypothesized that participants in the present study would feel they had
gathered enough moral credit to excuse refraining from further moral behavior, or their
moral credentials would frame the act of withholding help as not immoral in the first
place.

Consistency vs. Compensation
Moral behavior can result in either morally compensatory behavior or morally
consistent behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012). Whether a moral deed licenses an
individual to subsequently engage in immoral activity or remain consistent with their
moral identity depends on the nature of the moral behavior itself. Recalling one’s moral
identity in an abstract way (e.g., labeling one’s self as charitable or generous) tends to
result in behavior consistent with that conceptualized identity (Conway & Peetz, 2012;
Strenta & Dejong, 1981). On the other hand, if a person recalls a concrete moral act
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performed, they are more likely to perceive that act as a moral credit and feel licensed to
engage in immoral behavior (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Schadeva et al., 2009). For the
present study, participants recalled specific and recent moral acts in an attempt to yield
licensing.

Prescriptive Immorality
The present thesis is concerned with prescriptive immorality, a subset of
immorality in which a person refrains from helping. As opposed to proscriptive
immorality, which involves doing things we should not, prescriptive immorality involves
failing to do things we should (Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012). Prescriptive immorality
is vague, in that it does not involve action, and occurs in the absence of an incentive to
help. People are less motivated to behave prosocially (i.e., are not looking for moral
credits) when they feel licensed, which is why moral licensing can often result in
prescriptive immorality (Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012). Helping, in general, is a
prescriptive act in that it is voluntary and positive; the present study examined moral
licensing in the prescriptive domain of morality only.

High-Cost and Low-Cost Helping Behavior
Moral behavior licenses a person to engage in prescriptive immorality when the
helping behavior comes at a high cost (i.e., requiring the use of time or effort) (Conway
& Peetz, 2012; Schadeva et al., 2009). It frees them from the guilt associated with
withholding help because they feel as if they have done their moral duty and they are free
from feeling responsible. Although behaving altruistically is costly by definition
(Schadeva et al., 2009), the present study was interested in whether morally licensed
individuals feel entitled to refrain from performing prosocial acts that come at a low cost
(e.g., lending out a garden tool that you never use or letting someone cut you in the
check-out line when you are in no rush). Research has shown that licensed individuals are
less likely to help when the proposed helping behavior will cost them a significant
amount of resources (Schadeva et al., 2009); however, research has not yet examined the
effects of moral licensing on participation in low-cost helping behaviors. This was the
goal of the present study: to understand the influence of moral licensing on low-cost
helping behaviors in contrast with high-cost helping behaviors.
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Limitations of Previous Research
Previous research has found evidence for an effect of moral licensing on
prescriptive immorality when the prosocial act withheld would cost the individual
significant resources. However, research has not yet examined the influence of the cost of
helping on the likelihood of helping behavior after being morally licensed. That is, does
the cost of the moral action have an impact on the effects of moral licensing such that
low-cost helping behaviors are excused from the effects of the moral licensing
phenomenon, or are they impacted in the same way as high-cost helping behaviors? The
present study sought to examine this influence of cost on engagement in helping
behaviors after moral licensing.

Method
To examine the role of cost on helping behaviors after moral licensing, 121
participants (87 female, 34 male) were recruited from Introductory Psychology courses at
the University of Dayton. The data of 9 participants were removed before analysis due to
errors.
Participants were randomly assigned to either a licensing condition or a control
condition. They came into the lab and were either asked to write about a topic that relates
to morality or an event unrelated to morality. The participants in the licensing condition
were asked to write about a time when they “acted in such a way that they felt righteous
or honorable…” The same licensing mechanism developed by Conway & Peetz (2012)
was employed (with permission from the authors) in the present study. The participants in
the control condition were asked to recall what they ate for dinner over the past week, a
control condition (used successfully in previous research by Dr. O’Mara) that provides
the participants with a task that is independent of morality.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to read three short scenarios that called
for either high-cost or low-cost levels of helping. They then rated their willingness to
help in each scenario on a scale from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely (Conway &
Peetz, 2012). When the participants finished reading and evaluating the scenarios, they
completed demographic questions. Finally, the researcher told the students that the study
had ended, and the participants were debriefed.
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Results
A 2 (Moral Licensing: yes, no) x 2 (Cost: high, low) ANOVA was conducted to
examine whether moral licensing and cost interacted to predict helping and whether there
were main effects for moral licensing and cost on helping. A key interest was whether
morally licensed participants in the low-cost condition were significantly more willing to
help than morally licensed participants in the high-cost conditions. This would allow us
to conclude that the cost of helping is an important predictor and limitation of the effects
of moral licensing on helping behavior. If morally licensed participants in the low-cost
condition were not significantly more willing to help than morally licensed participants in
the high-cost condition, it would suggest that moral licensing affects helping behavior,
regardless of the cost of helping.
The results indicated that the interaction between moral licensing and cost was not
significant, F(1, 108) = 0.00, p = 0.99. As Figure 1 illustrates, moral licensing and cost
did not significantly interact to predict helping behavior. Further, we did not replicate the
moral licensing effect described in Conway & Peetz (2012). The analysis did not indicate
a significant main effect of moral licensing on helping behavior, F(1, 108) = 3.06, p =
0.08. In fact, we found a surprising trend in the opposite direction, such that the
participants in the moral licensing condition tended to help more (M = 6.226, SD = 0.715)
than the participants in the control condition (M = 6.040, SD = 0.840). We suspect that
the licensing manipulation yielded consistency rather than compensatory behavior.
Participants may not have thought about a concrete example of behaving morally in the
recent past, and instead perhaps thought of a vague example of their morality, yielding
behavior consistent with that identity.
We found a significant main effect of cost on helping behavior, such that the
participants were more willing to help in the low cost condition (M = 6.62, SD = 0.47)
than in the high cost condition (M = 5.67, SD = 0.74), F(1, 108) = 66.60, p <.0001. This
finding serves as a pilot test for subsequent studies and a manipulation check for our cost
of helping manipulation. To better test whether helping significantly varied by cost
without the influence of the moral licensing information, we examined only the data from
participants in the control condition to examine the effect of cost on helping. There was
also a significant main effect for cost, F(1, 57) = 28.54, p < .0001, such that the mean
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willingness to help rating in the low cost condition (M = 6.529, SD = 0.531) was
significantly higher than the mean willingness to help rating in the high-cost condition (M
= 5.567, SD = 0.817), see Figure 2. This indicates that participants who read scenarios
that were low in cost-to-self rated themselves as significantly more likely to engage in the
helping behavior described than participants that read scenarios that were high in cost-toself.

Limitations and Discussion
First, the present study demonstrated the need for more reliable moral licensing
manipulations. The initial writing task that participants completed did not succeed in
licensing the participants in the moral licensing condition in the way that it did in the
Conway & Peetz (2012) study. Perhaps the present study did not replicate the
manipulation exactly as Conway & Peetz employed it, or perhaps the manipulation is
simply not reliable. Whatever the case, more studies should be done to develop this
manipulation in order to test further hypotheses on moral licensing and its effects.
Second, the present study examined participants’ willingness to help in
hypothetical situations. To obtain more concrete evidence for the effects of moral
licensing in real-life situations, more research should be conducted to evaluate
participants’ helping behaviors in actual scenarios. This would allow findings to be
generalized and to reliably describe the helping behaviors of various populations.
Since the present study did find evidence that individuals tend to help more when
the cost-to-self is low, it would be interesting to see if this trend is maintained when the
individuals are licensed. The results of this study add to the body of research describing
when people are likely or not likely to behave morally. They also highlight that the
present literature on moral licensing needs to be revisited and replicated in order to
enhance its reliability. Research in the realm of moral licensing is important for
understanding how humans tend to behave in various situations, specifically when moral
decision-making is involved.

Future Directions
To reevaluate the moral licensing manipulation, we are conducting a follow-up
study in which we will use the effective cost manipulation, but alter the moral licensing
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manipulation. We will construct the moral licensing manipulation based on multiple
studies, in addition to the Conway & Peetz (2012) article, in order to yield higher
efficacy. We are also including more specific instructions for the moral writing task, a
longer period of required writing time, and a filler task to be completed before the
helping scenarios are read and evaluated. We hope that these changes will result in an
effective moral licensing manipulation and allow us to study its effects on helping in
high-cost and low-cost situations.
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Figure 1.
Participants’ mean willingness to help across licensing and cost conditions.
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Figure 2.
Control participants' mean willingness to help across cost conditions.
7

Helping Behavior

6
5
4
3

Control

2
1
0
Low‐Cost

High‐Cost

Cost of Helping

